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1. The aesthetic and the terrorizing–opening Pandora’s terror
box with aesthetic tools
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The publication of a special volume on such a thorny and
controversial topic as the a nity between aesthetics and
terrorism is not just timely but long overdue. The rst decade of
the twenty- rst century witnessed the steep rise of terrorist
occurrences, that is, cases of extreme, asymmetric (so-called
political) violence in icted against innocent, unsuspecting
people, while the current decade, drawing rapidly to its close,
has raised the bar for terror to unprecedented heights, with
terrorist strikes reaching global, epidemic proportions.
Undoubtedly, it was 9/11 that opened the Pandora box,
ushering humanity into the new era of fundamentalist–mostly
religious–terrorism and subsequently spawning counterterrorist
agendas inspired by War on Terror dogma. Eighteen years have
gone by since that watershed event, but the dust does not seem
to have settled yet, given that the repercussions have
dramatically and increasingly a ected people’s daily routine on
many di erent levels.

Browse
Archive
Search …
Search
Search Archive
Search

Still, what is of more importance is the realization that terrorism,
today, is felt as something that has somehow assumed a life of
its own, growing independently of any potential “initial” root
cause that ignited the terror epidemic in the rst place. It is a
shocking fact that there was a tenfold rise in the number of
victims of terrorism worldwide between 2000 and 2014, while in
Europe alone, terror attacks increased by almost 40% after
2013.[1] Of course, one cannot possibly ignore or forget that the
military action taken against Iraq and Afghanistan in the
aftermath of 9/11, however well-intended, ended up fanning the
ames of fanaticism and terror, thus back ring on Western
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/10/31/article-877/
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counterterrorist practices and leading to a spiral of violence. On
the other hand, the escalation of the phenomenon in the
twenty- rst century has created the suspicion that political and
rationalistic discourse probably does not su ce to fully
comprehend and e ectively confront terrorism. As the papers in
the present volume demonstrate, a more imaginative and,
indeed, aesthetic approach is needed, given that terrorism is an
issue the treatment of which frequently, if not always, verges on
imagination, the mythological, the unknown, or even the unreal.
The analysis of terror and terrorism could not be more
dependent upon aesthetic investigation and re ection. By
“aesthetics,” here we do not necessarily mean the beautiful or
even the artistic. The term, in this context, is more broadly
conceived to signify sense perception and focused sensibility.
Such an interpretation of aesthetics encompasses the entire
range of human activity. The element of “feeling” as sense
perception is crucial for comprehending how terrorism works
through shock and fear, how it imposes its terrible immediacy
upon the subject of terror, and how it is represented,
understood, and used by media and other cultural and political
formations. The foundation of an aesthetic approach is
aesthetic appreciation, and by this we do not mean admiration
or acceptance of violence. The papers in this volume testify to
the decisive role of aesthetic appreciation in comprehending,
evaluating, and, potentially, countering terror. Aesthetically
appreciating terror entails understanding it with our senses and
grasping it through various non-instrumentalist faculties, the
activation of which leads, for instance, to empathizing with
those in pain or abjection. As I have argued elsewhere, aesthetic
judgment “yields alternative or additional insights into a terrorist
incident that reason, alone, cannot account for and helps retain
an ethical . . . stance towards terrorism.”[2] The ethical element,
that is, is already built into aesthetic appreciation or, as Arnold
Berleant supports in his paper for this volume, an engaged
appreciation of violence is “a humanizing force by giving
negative testimony to the moral import of aesthetic experience”
and an act of sensitizing and chastening those who encounter
violence.[3]
Terrorism is, almost by de nition, aesthetic, insofar as it appeals
to the senses not only of those who are directly a ected by it
but, more importantly, of those who constitute its real
“audience,” to whom the perpetrators are sending a message via
a speci c act of extreme political violence. The aesthetics of a
terrorist act is discernible in the fact that when one addresses
terrorism one is not just grappling with the terrorist act per se;
to think about terrorism is also to re ect on the images it
produces, the ways it is represented by the media, the
narratives of victims, the discourse and language of the
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/10/31/article-877/
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perpetrators, the assumptions and policies of counterterrorism,
and even the narratives of fear about the future created in the
collective imaginary.
The fear of terrorism in popular imagination is not connected
exclusively with a single act of terror that takes place at a certain
moment or took place in the past, but rather with the possibility
of follow-up attacks that will potentially occur in the future.
People become so much a ected by terror psychologically and
emotionally because they anticipate the advent of something
unimaginably worse than what has already befallen them, and
that element adds to the mystery of or, at times, even
fascination with terrorism. In this lens, terrorism, in the
collective unconscious, is about the future, not the present. As
Michael Frank explains, the fear of or anxiety over an imminent
attack bears on the tendency of the individual imagination to
fantasize about disasters and, in fact, constitutes the basic
justi cation for extreme counterterrorist practices verging, at
times, on the irrational: “Terror involves intrusions of the
(imagined) future into the present, in other words,
‘ ashforwards’. [It] is the fearful anticipation of future violence–
based on, and initiated by, the occurrence of violence in the
past.”[4] Imagination resides at the core of the aesthetic of
terror. And how could it not, since it is precisely the
counterterrorist imagination that, through self-ful lling
processes (and prophesies) and with the help of the media,
creates, in advance, the circumstances of terrorism by
inculcating in citizens’ minds the fear of a future attack, even
when there is no logical justi cation for such fear, thereby
inevitably keeping entire populations in a state of emergency
and materializing the so-called state of exception. In fact, the
post-World War II nation-state admittedly appears to regularly
exempt itself “from the rule of law: it gives itself permission to
do whatever it deems necessary to crush the enemy, and it, the
state, alone will decide when it is safe to return to normality.”[5]
In sum, counterterrorist and counterinsurgent policies fantasize
about the hovering presence of an invisible other that could
strike at any moment and, intentionally or not, encourage the
assumption that “attacks can trigger more attacks by
themselves, in an automated, self-propelling cycle of violence,”
states Thomas Renard.[6]
If it is accurate that anti-state terrorism is contagious, in the
sense that terrorist groups learn from, or imitate each other,[7]
then, the feeling of fear, of the very threat of terror in the future
is unquestionably contagious too, in the sense that it quasimagically spreads among the people like a virus, thereby
normalizing an ambience of insecurity and irrational but
ubiquitous terror about one’s own survival. Is this “collective
psychosis” the new normal? “The perceived ubiquity of the
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/10/31/article-877/

3/22

10/5/2020

https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/10/31/article-877/

terrorist threat . . . is further reinforced by the security-focused
political discourse. The communication of threat levels by the
authorities is somehow institutionalising–almost normalising–
the threat perception,” as observed by Renard.[8] This kind of
overreaction on the part of the state is very much desired by
terrorists, whose propaganda taps into the mass-hysteria
concerning terrorist violence. One thinks that terrorism feeds
upon aesthetics to spread its messages by making an individual
feel that his or her life is in danger, without being able to explain
this feeling rationally.
2. De nitions, characteristics and conventions
Although attempting to de ne terrorism is a tricky business–
there are over a hundred di erent de nitions of the term–there
being always the risk of sweeping statements leading to
overgeneralizations and, eventually, misconceptions, one of the
few de nitions of the term doing justice to the very nature of
the phenomenon is the de nition given by Igor Primoratz.
According to him, terrorism is “the deliberate use of violence, or
threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of
intimidating some other people” into a course of political action
“they otherwise would not take.”[9] Primoratz insinuates that
terrorism is not about the perpetration of political violence;
rather, it is about the threat of perpetrating it. Intimidation
speaks volumes to the hearts and minds of people, particularly
those that have witnessed a terrorist attack or heard of it, who
feel that they might be next on the hit list. Psychological
coercion is the immediate objective of a terrorist group that
wants to cash in on the paralyzing terror felt by those who
haven’t been hit yet–rather than those directly a ected. Thomas
Hobbes, re ecting on life during wartime, observes that there is
nothing worse than living in “continual fear and danger of
violent death,” and as long as this fear exists it would be
impossible for the individual to focus on anything else.[10]
Hobbes calls attention to the inevitable fact that the daily
routine of the paralyzed, terri ed subject is completely
shattered because the feeling of helplessness conquers the
person(s) in utter distress. Of course, Hobbes is here referring to
wartime conditions. However, it is likely that a violent strike
during peace, which is when terrorism usually irrupts, like an
anomaly, would far more traumatize the subject because it
would be experienced as something unexpected and
“irrational.”[11] The main constituent of the concept of
terrorism, lying at its core, is the ingredient of terror, which
entails that an act of terrorism, in the mind of the perpetrator,
derives its supposed value from its ability to terrify; if it can’t do
that, it cannot possibly succeed in coercing its audience–
witnesses and distant others–into taking a certain kind of action
it would otherwise not take.
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/10/31/article-877/
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A second and just as important point made by Primoratz hinges
on the idea that terrorism always has an audience that needs to
be “persuaded” about the legitimacy of its political cause and
the righteousness of its acts. To achieve their goals, terrorists
usually in ict violence upon innocent noncombatants to send a
dramatic message to their real audience: politicians,
governments, institutions, and so on. In other words, the
theatrical element is already inherent in how terrorists
communicate their purposes, while rhetoric and symbolism
permeate their communication with those in authority, usually
the target group called upon to decipher the meaning behind a
terrorist strike and successfully predict the place and time of a
next attack. Intriguingly, it may also happen that there is no
message or meaning behind an attack, in which case one might
consider the possibility that terrorism creates its own realities
or, better, “its own (hyperreal) circumstances,” as Robert
Appelbaum argues in the volume, drawing upon Jean
Baudrillard’s concept of hyperreality: “In sending messages,
terrorist violence engages in theatrics. And its theatrics is not
merely an e ort to in uence public opinion; it is to change the
circumstances of and for public opinion. That it comes with
disruption, death, and destruction is part of the strategy or
tactic.”[12]
Terrorism derives its e cacy from its very suddenness. As I have
argued elsewhere, an act of terrorism “associates itself with
political agendas and motivations (or at least, it claims it does);
moreover, its intention is to take a society (community, group,
entity, etc.) by surprise as an imponderable, asymmetric factor
that disrupts the normal cycle of human activity, an extremely
violent otherness that feels ‘unprecedented’ to the human
mind.”[13] Terrorism is not an ideology but a tactic or
methodology of which a terrible characteristic, especially in the
post 9/11 era, is not just its abruptness but its irrationality, in
addition to its non-fastidiousness in terms of the frequently
random selection of the victims, what Berleant has called a
“vicious lottery” in order to describe the haphazard nature of
recent attacks related to Islamic or anti-Islamic fundamentalism.
[14]
An act of terrorist violence relies heavily upon the images it
creates. In fact, one could safely claim that in an age of
unprecedented visuality–television, internet, social media, and
the like–terrorism is constituted by its very image. If the image
produced by the terrorist act is not shocking enough to not just
grab the attention of the viewers but also horrify them, then the
terrorist will not be able to communicate his or her message
and a ect (or manipulate) public opinion, one of the main
targets of terrorism in the modern age. The unbelievable
footage from the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks exempli es
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/10/31/article-877/
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the primacy of the shocking image in the eyes of the terrorist
and its dramatic impact upon distant viewers. Perhaps the most
stunning and visually shocking terrorist attack in history before
the September 11 horror was the Munich Olympics attack in
1972 perpetrated by a relatively new, at the time, Palestinian
group called Black September. After a raid on the Olympic
village, Black September killed two athletes of the Israeli
Olympic team and captured nine more, in an attempt to shift
the attention of Western audiences and governments to the
Palestinian problem and demand the release of 234 political
prisoners. The hit was unprecedented not only because it was
carried out during the Olympic Games, a symbolic period of
cease re and peace among nations, but mainly because it was
widely televised. More than 800 million spectators were
watching the games live when the attack occurred. All those
distant, yet awe-struck viewers were called upon to make sense
of what was going on, using their imagination while trying to
process all the information coming from the media and the
various journalistic narrativizations of the event.
By the late 1960s, the power of television to inform, in uence,
and, more seriously, shape public opinion was evident.
Terrorists around the world were quick to grasp the signi cance
of the TV in publicizing an issue, not to mention its ability to
create an aesthetic spectacle connected with that issue through
drama and narrativity, thereby giving terrorists the opportunity
to mystify viewers and gain their favor. Publicity is terrorists’ “life
blood and their oxygen. No other medium has provided more
oxygen to terrorism than television because of its ability to
report the news instantly, nonstop, and in visuals and words
from any place to all parts of the globe, a facility that has
a ected the reporting patterns of other media as well.”[15] It
could be argued that the media are very important not just in
disseminating news on terrorism, but, ironically, in creating the
circumstances for the terrorist incident. In essence, a
“successful” attack is one that is witnessed by a global audience.
In other words, there is complicity between media and terrorist
groups to the extent that the terrifying images transmitted
through the TV sets call attention to the political propaganda of
the terrorists by appealing to the sensibilities of spectators. The
aesthetics of terrorism “lies largely in its bizarre drama, its
deliberately staged theatricality.”[16] As Appelbaum contends,
“the agents of terrorism are in a strange alliance with the
witnesses of terrorism. An event occurs; the mass media
respond; and a new, largely theatrical dialogue ensues, where
the media mediate the meaning of what has occurred.”[17] He
refers to how sportscaster Jim McKay, looking as if he were not
able to withhold his tears, addressed the audience thus: “We
just got the nal word . . . you know, when I was a kid, my father
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/10/31/article-877/
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used to say ‘Our greatest hopes and our worst fears are seldom
realized.’ Our worst fears have been realized tonight.”[18]
Despite the utter “materiality” of the event–the terrorist attack
did happen–the drama unfolded in highly aesthetic terms. The
journalist recalls his childhood, unconsciously asking his
audience to become emotional and also fearful of the
inconceivable. It is interesting, to say the least, that the audience
is made to feel the full-blown reality of the Munich Olympics
attack by means of an aesthetic (hence, somehow, ctional)
presentation of the whole story.
In essence, the TV became the platform for the
internationalization of terrorism in the 1960s. Terrorism turned
international when terrorist organizations decided to step up
their campaigns by rendering what used to be seen as a local
cause into something much broader. Hijacking aircraft and
capturing passengers as hostages internationalized their cause
by involving also countries and citizens that were often
irrelevant to their purposes. The more irrelevant the target, the
more irrational the strike, hence the more horrifying and
convincing the message behind the strike. Attacking
noncombatants and hijacking commercial airliners
internationalized terrorism and put a lot of psychological
pressure upon governments, given that Western media were
now taking much more interest in terrorists and their demands
because the theater of operations was larger. Before the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a branch of
the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization), took over an aircraft
of Israel’s national airline on 22 July 1968, it used to unleash,
together with the PLO, terrorist violence against the Israeli
military infrastructure. But the world was hardly interested in
military operations in remote, non-Western areas. Allegedly,
with the new tactical change that involved innocent
noncombatants, the international community would be forcibly
re-sensitized to a serious problem of injustice. People around
the world could not look away also because the feeling that
nobody is safe anywhere would be overwhelming. A year later,
in 1969, the PFLP hijacked a TWA ight taking o from Rome,
diverted it to Algiers, evacuated it and blew it up on live TV.
Regardless of the physical distance between the plane and the
TV viewers, the latter could not help but witness in awe the
unprecedented image of destruction, an aesthetic image that
would undermine their sense of personal safety and
unconsciously evoke the feeling that a change of political
perspective was needed. The majority of the papers in this
volume emphasize the dubious role of the image as propaganda
either for terrorism or counterterrorism. We will see, for
instance, how Palestinian TV programs use visual aesthetics to
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/10/31/article-877/
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“turn” the sensibilities of children and make them embrace the
ght against Israel.[19]
Agents of terrorism frequently resort to symbolic and almost
literary language to explain their actions. Admittedly, a terrorist
usually attacks institutions for symbolic reasons, expecting that
there will be collateral deaths in the process. We should not
forget about one of the earliest twentieth-century terrorist
occurrences in America, the Wall Street bombing in 1920,
allegedly carried out by Italian anarchists, during which thirtyeight people were killed. While a strike is usually symbolic, it
seems that the symbolism spills over into the terrorist’s afterthe-fact justi cations for perpetrating the attack. Those
justi cations turn out to be really crucial, insofar as they
unconsciously legitimate their horri c act in the minds of both
terrorists and spectators. The Munich Olympics attack was
indeed symbolic and highly innovative, since taking Israeli
athletes as hostages on German territory could be interpreted,
as it indeed was, as an act of equating the Israeli forces in
Palestine with the Nazi occupiers in Europe in the Second World
War.[20] Yet, the symbolism of an act is not the only thing that
matters to perpetrators, who tend to aestheticize or represent
through metaphor the outcome of their actions in order to
legitimate their cause, attract new members, or even ingratiate
themselves with the public. A few days after the Munich horror,
there was a communiqué in a Beirut newspaper issued by the
terrorists themselves, who celebrated their “achievement” thus:
“A bomb in the White House . . . [or] an earthquake in Paris
could not have echoed through the consciousness of every man
in the world like the operation at Munich. . . . The choice of the
Olympics, from the purely propagandistic view-point. . . was like
painting the name of Palestine on a mountain . . . seen from the
four corners of the earth.”[21] On a similar note, Fatah leader
Salah Khalef once declared that “we are planting the seed.
Others will harvest it. . . .”[22]
3. The return to the material
Intriguingly, there is a paradox underlying such statements as
the ones above, and that paradox is an intrinsically aesthetic
one insofar as it bears on an unconscious negotiation between
the literal and the metaphorical, both in terms of language and
of praxis. Whereas terrorists frequently argue for the need to
shake o people’s political apathy by going back to the real and
the literal, they ironically cling to the theoretical and the
metaphorical to inspire the masses and ignite a revolution. It is
important to remind ourselves, at this point, of one of the main
pillars of terrorist (or “freedom ghter”) mentality throughout
the ages: the principle of the propaganda of the deed. That
principle was rst articulated in the nineteenth century by Carlo
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/10/31/article-877/
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Pisacane, an Italian anarchist, who expressed the idea that the
masses needed to be inspired by a sensational hit against
society rather than by theories and revolutionary pamphlets:
“Propaganda of the idea is a chimera. The education of the
people is an absurdity. Ideas result from deeds, not the latter
from the former. . . . The only work a citizen can do for the good
of the country is that of cooperating with the material
revolution.”[23] Pisacane thought that action would motivate the
people to educate themselves and side with the revolution.
Theory could not possibly lead to practice, while violence, by
itself, was educative because of its didactic and moral aspects:
“People would not be educated till they were free, and
education did not precede freedom. In other words, physical
violence was, by itself, a political language that could be spoken
and understood.”[24]
The propaganda of the deed called for the prioritization of
materiality and a return to the real. In essence, this was an
attempt to show the superiority of deeds over words, and that
claim was also made by several other terrorist or revolutionary
groups, including leftist organizations in Western democracies,
such as the RAF in West Germany, the Weatherman in the US,
and jihadist organizations like ISIS. Khalef’s statement
concerning Palestine is indicative of an equivocal concentration
on “beautiful” language and aesthetics on the part of insurgents.
Such a concentration is not necessarily exclusively attributable
to a desire to fashion themselves as “artists” or to a
spontaneous outpouring of enthusiasm about their own actions,
but also to an attempt to attract future recruits by luring those
into embracing their allegedly just, ethical, and, therefore, in
their eyes, beautiful cause. Katya Mandoki, in the special
volume, explains how aesthetics can easily slide into an ugly
propaganda for a political, or other cause and how the abuse of
aesthetics and a perverted sense of aesthetic education are
signs of a radical unfreedom: “[B]eauty . . . can be used to incite
violence. . . .” Aesthetic materials at the hands of terrorism
might turn into “vehicles for glorifying murder and
destruction.”[25]
Aesthetic means are always important for the self-fashioning of
terrorists, and also for the illustration of the superiority of their
revolutionary or radical vision. More speci cally, the aesthetic
aspect of terrorist declarations and proclamations cannot be
disengaged from the feeling that their call for a return to the
palpable and the real amounts to a call for retrieving the
“aesthesis” of things and materiality. That call assumes various
forms in the agenda and politics of the majority of terrorist
groups from the nineteenth to the twenty- rst centuries,
probably constituting the through-line connecting a wide array
of terrorist waves. Anarchist violence from the second half of
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/10/31/article-877/
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the nineteenth to the rst two decades of the twentieth century
prioritized action, for instance, political assassinations, for its
sheer physicality and deep-seated irrationality. The appalling act
of terror is a message in itself, the loud articulation (or, rather,
“detonation”) of which enables every citizen to wake up to a new
and authentic reality.[26] While anarchism was on the wane
after the end of World War I, it was anti-colonial and nationalist
struggles that addressed the necessity of reattaching oneself to
a palpable reality of essential freedom, as posited by Indian
freedom ghter Bhagwati Charan Vohra in his book The
Philosophy of Bomb,[27] or, just as signi cantly, by Ramdane
Abane, the leader of the FLN in Algeria, who understood that
revolutionary struggle would be e ective only if it was
transferred to civilian, non-military areas, so that it could
dramatically a ect the lives of innocent noncombatants, thereby
shocking the international community by speaking to its heart
and sense of humanity.[28] A reawakening of the senses and
the retrieval of sensibility gured prominently in the demands
made by leftist terrorist groups in Western democratic countries
during the 1960s and 1970s. The Red Army Faction (RAF) in West
Germany, for example, prepared every terrorist strike in such a
way as to be received as primarily an aesthetic assault–an
unannounced strike at the heart and the senses. At the same
time, they perceived the human body to be a weapon against
hypocrisy and the basic tool for rede ning the human. For them,
destruction was a new mode of celebrating humanity.[29]
The decline of nationalist and leftist terrorist violence towards
the end of the 1980s was quickly followed by the rise of religious
terrorism and, more particularly, Islamist fundamentalism in the
1990s, almost in the immediate aftermath of the dissolution of
the Soviet Union and the collapse of communism, a turning
point in recent history that resulted in the establishment of a
single capitalist world order, synonymous with what we today
call “globalization.” There are various reasons for the rise of
Islamist fundamentalism, and analyzing its historical or even
sociological underpinnings does not fall within the scope of the
present volume.[30] What is very signi cant for us to see is how
the aesthetics of Islamist terrorism ties in with its political and
religious expressions, interpretations, and representations. For
the religious terrorist, violence is a “sacramental act or divine
duty executed in direct response to some theological demand or
imperative. Terrorism thus assumes a transcendental
dimension, and its perpetrators therefore often disregard the
political, moral, or practical constraints that may a ect other
terrorists.”[31] Terrorists inspired by religion view themselves as
outsiders aiming at transforming the existing order, while “this
sense of alienation also enables [them] to contemplate far more
destructive and deadly types of terrorist operations than secular
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/10/31/article-877/
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terrorists.”[32] Religious terrorists usually commit blind acts of
terror against greater masses of people, mostly because they
are under the delusion that they only answer to God, who has
given them the authority to dispense justice as they think t, a
very empowering and aesthetically appealing picture to them,
indeed. To render their messages as convincing as possible by
appealing to the sense of horror, they prefer killing people,
including themselves during suicide attacks, to taking hostages.
In their mind, there are no innocent noncombatants; there are
only soldiers at war, and urban areas are their battle eld.
Indiscriminate Islamist violence was unleashed, in a spectacular
mode, by Al Qaeda, at the dawn of the twenty- rst century,
raising the bar for terror and simultaneously challenging the
exceptionality of the West. The very images produced by the
9/11 attack were deemed so impressive and spectacular that
they were associated, consciously or not, with cinematic ction.
Some thinkers and critics went as far as to claim that the
impossible images evoked a sense of the sublime through their
capacity to repulse and attract at the same time, while others
took the opportunity to explore the limits of art in conjunction
with terror, both as an event and a representation.[33] Kelsie
Donnelly, in one of the essays for this volume, touches upon
how performance art taps into such ambivalent feelings to make
a statement on the precariousness and terror of the human
condition, while Thorsten Botz-Bornstein, borrowing from
Derrida, comments upon how representation, artistic or other,
can be overcome through cruelty.[34] Jean Baudrillard, in his
analysis of the spectacle of September 11, did not di erentiate
between the strike and its aesthetic aspects, holding that the
terrorizing impact of 9/11 was inextricably bound up with the
images produced. In other words, he meant that the terrorist
attack at issue would be almost nothing without the images
accompanying it, and it was obviously orchestrated in this way
by the Al Qaeda terrorists. In fact, its symbolism was so great
that its depiction as a “real” event has to be challenged:
The collapse of the . . . towers is unimaginable, but that is not
enough to make it a real event. An excess of violence is not
enough to open on to reality. For reality is a principle . . . and it is
this principle that is lost. . . . [T]he fascination with the attack is
primarily a fascination with the image. . . . We try retrospectively
to impose some kind of meaning on it . . . [and] there is none.
And it is the radicality of the spectacle, the brutality of the
spectacle, which alone is original and irreducible.[35]

4. Art, media, and counterterrorism
The violence unleashed by Al-Qaeda is symbolic, spectacular,
and, as observed earlier, hyperreal, as contrasted to the
practices of ISIS or the Islamic State, as we will see later.
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/10/31/article-877/
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Compared to the unprecedented image of 9/11, US
counterterrorism, or the so-called War on Terror, has failed
miserably:
Subsequent attempts by the United States to stage spectacular
events have failed. For example, the US e ort to transform the
military strategy of Shock and Awe into a spectacle, as it invaded
Iraq in 2003, in icted devastating human su ering but failed
aesthetically. Live images like those shown on CNN were far from
iconic and had relatively little visual impact.[36]

One may easily draw the conclusion that what is at stake is a
war of images; indeed, an aesthetic rivalry that prevails over
and, at the same time, determines, politics and ideologies. Al
Qaeda’s most impressive terrorist act represents a new kind of
ultra-terrorism that combines accuracy, e ciency,
inventiveness, and great lethality. It sent 3,000 people to their
deaths and communicated a powerful and threatening message
to viewers around the world, including citizens of the US, who
were now experiencing for the rst time on American soil what a
massive terrorist strike felt like. Up until that point, for the
majority of Western citizens, terror was just a remote image on
the TV set that had hardly anything to do with their own
personal lives.
Aside from the sensational, ction-like, but bloodless image of
the planes crashing into the World Trade Center (we never saw
the actual killing of the people inside), there was some
absolutely horri c footage of bloodied people in despair and
horror having to decide, in a split second, whether to jump to
their death from the World Trade Center or burn inside it. In the
aftermath of the attacks, those images of “falling men” were
quickly censored and hidden from view, not only because they
de ed the sense of decency, morality, and humanity, but, more
signi cantly, because they undermined the narrative of the
invulnerability of the American nation and, by extension, the
image of robustness traditionally associated with Western
Christianity. Donnelly emphasizes the utter state of abjection in
which those victims found themselves, suspended between life
and death, and clari es that the very image of abjection went
against the American dogma of innocence and the
exceptionality of the American trauma. However, if politics and
institutionalized media discourse blur the memory of horror by
removing images of agony and mourning solely over American
trauma, which will eventually heal because the nation is
supposedly strong, it is radical art, or abject art, that can
preserve the memory of the atrocity by presenting the
forbidden image and showing the persons in complete abjecthood.[37] The abject artist is emblematized in novelistic writing
by Don de Lillo’s “falling man,” the performance artist irregularly
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re-enacting the real fall of those trapped in the WTC. The artist
functions as a kind of terrorist, who “does not obliterate the
boundaries between life and death, or victim and terrorist, but
re gures them instead through the a ective response that his
art elicits.”[38] Arguably, radical art is in a position to blow the
cover not only of conventional art, but also of hegemonic and
polarizing narratives, such as the counterterrorist narrative of
good versus evil. In this context, the image of the artist/terrorist
is paradoxically a positive and benign one, in the sense that it
serves as an ethical reminder of the inescapability of death and
ever presence of terror in dangerous times, in the face of
optimistic and sanitizing counterterrorist myths that obfuscate
the reality of tragedy and trauma.
But if radical art is capable of disrupting the sanitizing narrative
of the War on Terror via the forbidden image of the abject’s
body, institutionalized art, such as TV shows about crime and
terrorism, like CSI or NCIS, for instance, exposes viewers, via its
wound aesthetic, to all the gory details and graphic scenes that
they were spared during and the immediate aftermath of 9/11,
thereby appearing to critique the entire logic of the War on
Terror based upon the principle of non-vulnerability, as Chris
Davies argues in the volume, thus, unknowingly “responding” to
Donnelly’s paper. On the other hand, as Davies observes, such
TV shows, ironically, end up reasserting the counterterrorist,
neoconservative discourse “with consistent, late-narrative
reorientations of the wound that draw audience attention away
from the body and onto the accuracy and reliability of advanced
scienti c technology,” thus providing “a recuperative narrative
about the State’s ability to respond to political violence.”[39] An
unwavering reliance upon the power of science and technology
is a structural element of both forensic dramas treated in this
volume, CSI and NCIS, and an integral part of their
counterterrorist aesthetics, but the important element herein is
that in both shows that reliance, which is accompanied by
suspicion of conventional narration, serves to eliminate the
uncertainty of the post-9/11 world and temporarily eradicate the
fear of death by terrorism.[40] Television forensic drama
oscillates between showing and simultaneously withholding
images of violence reminiscent of both the 9/11 terror and the
War on Terror. Spectators are required to aesthetically
“appreciate” the carnage, but without immersing themselves in
it for too long. Nonetheless, as Davies insinuates, even scenes of
graphic violence and dehumanization did not seem to subvert
the dominant counterterrorist discourse after 9/11. Real images
of falling men, construed earlier as radical witnesses to human
abjection and the brutality of violence, were readily exploited by
institutionalized discourse and the entertainment industry as
signi ers of the heroism, rather than abject-hood, of the victims.
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/10/31/article-877/
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5. Jihad, imagination, and the aesthetics of brutality
Writing on modernity and Islamism, John Gray makes the claim
that “Islamist movements think of violence as a means of
creating a new world, and in this they belong not in the medieval
past but the modern West.”[41] Bornstein makes the very
interesting allegation that ISIS is actually a futurist, or futuristlike, movement, inspired by modernist Italian Futurism and the
latter’s fascination with the machine and material reality. Early
twentieth-century Futurism was a utopian optimistic movement
that had a deep-rooted faith in creating a better future society.
As Bornstein argues, by contrast to postmodernity’s dystopian
and profoundly pessimistic, or nihilistic, dismissal of the
authentic and the real in favor of the virtual, the ironic, and the
spectacular, Futurist modernity developed an unswerving faith
in the palpable, the material, and the analogical, and it was
precisely that faith that attracted ISIS ghters and supporters.
[42] The “culture” of ISIS seems to revisit twentieth-century
terrorism’s fascination with violence, cruelty, and materiality as
true signs of an authentic existence and real humanity. Let us be
reminded that various groups of the previous century had
already resorted to terror as a means of shaking the crowds out
of their apathy and indi erence and awakening them to the
necessity of revolution for the sake of regaining the aesthesis of
reality. What is more, in the case of ISIS, “a new category of
propaganda of the deed arises since the brutality of the terrorist
act is prioritized over the religious principles the act is
supposedly founded upon: the real emerges as something
which is above rational or religious explication of any kind. . .
.”[43]
Jihadism, as an aesthetic entity or even “a magical” or “catch-all
phrase point[ing] to the embodiment of an apocalypse, [and]
the sublime realization of God’s will at the expense of . . .
nonbelievers” lies at the center of the Islamist terrorism of ISIS.
[44] Islamist radicalism lapses into terrorism once the religious
element is transformed into a political message or, to employ
the terminology we used earlier on, when metaphor turns into
sheer literarity. They “will go for dogmatism and not for
irony.”[45] Desperate to nd real-life examples for the
metaphorical and metaphysical lessons extracted from the
Quran, and eager to adopt an exclusivist rather than pluralist
reading of the holy book, Islamists throw themselves into terror
to be able to connect their own system of beliefs to actual
reality. This attempt could be seen as motivated by an aesthetic
kind of morality; that is, by a set of transcendental ideas–the
virtue of jihad, Islamic paradise, the coming of the caliphate, or
the superiority of the sharia law–that are already shot through
with an aestheticized vision of oneself as someone who, by
“sacri cing” himself in a suicide attack, is given access to a
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material paradise with seventy-two virgins awaiting him: “the
reward must always be aesthetic even if the narrative, excuse or
ideal is presented as moral,” as Mandoki argues.[46] In a similar
tone, Bornstein holds that “religious fanatics are puritans whose
minds are attuned to what they think of as transcendental ideas.
. . . However, even though they aspire to a metaphysical world,
quite paradoxically it is concrete corporeal pleasures that
allegedly await them in the metaphysical afterlife.”[47]
The very notion of jihad plays into the fantasies of both the
Islamic constituency and Westerners wishing to experience a
supposedly authentic experience, an adventure, away from the
apathy, consumerism, and complacency of living in the West.
Taking “jihad” literally rather than metaphorically, namely, as a
physical rather than spiritual struggle, entails the annihilation of
all in dels and the realization of an essentially utopian as well as
non-traditionalist society ruled by brutality:
[Right after they established the Caliphate] [t]hey began to
impose their strict fundamentalist vision: . . . “in dels” (nonMuslims, those who refused to publicly endorse their ideology
and even those accused of petty crimes like drinking alcohol)
were tried and, in many cases, executed; women were forced
into marriages and then raped; Christians were publicly cruci ed
and left to die slowly over the course of several days. . . .[48]

ISIS’ preference for the “real” and the material was exempli ed
more recently by the shift from “corporeal” terrorism, like
lynching and ritualized executions staged for the camera, to a
more “quotidian,” or casual, as I have called it,[49] type of
“pedestrian” shootings–the November 15, 2015 multiple killings
in Paris being a case in point–that typically constitute one-o
events, snapshots of which are disseminated by social media
arresting “a sense of frequency of violence” and breaking away
from the sublime and spectacular aesthetic of the 9/11 type.[50]
If, as we noted in the beginning of the introduction, terrorist
abnormality is the new normal, then the shift to casual or
quotidian terror shows that normality is the natural background
of contemporary violence.
ISIS has proven its ability to inspire terrorism on a global level
more than Al Qaeda did in the past. Understandably, news of
the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of ISIS, on 26 October
2019, a few days before the publication of this volume, was
largely received with feelings of relief. ISIS had managed to
recruit at least 30,000 foreign citizens, 5,000 of whom were from
the European continent, while in 2014 there were up to 70,000
active Twitter accounts used by ISIS sympathizers, which
demonstrates the organization’s keen recruitment and
propaganda strategies.[51] ISIS’ purpose was multiple: ignite a
feeling of fear and insecurity, provoke extreme counterterrorist
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reaction, thus uniting Muslims in an anti-Western cultural or
civilizational war, and, nally, inspire additional attacks by
various sympathizers, who would try to imitate or outbid the
terrorists by mimicking or improving their techniques. All those
objectives have a bearing on the aesthetic, rhetorical, symbolic
and communicational aspects of ISIS terrorism. When it comes
to ISIS, the widely circulated idea that terrorism is contagious is
perhaps not as serious as the idea that it is actually fear of
terrorism that is contagiously spreading around the globe; in
essence, what is at issue is fear of the future itself: “The danger
comes less from ISIS actions than from our own
(over)reactions.”[52] Arguably, the declaration of war against
terrorism and the adoption of measures of exception are two
sides of the same coin. Counterinsurgent action and state
terrorism are frequently complementary to each other, or, to
put it better, there is an extremely thin line between
counterterrorism and the sti ing of the individual instinct for
liberty. In times of terror like ours, governments pose a critical
dilemma to the people, asking them to decide what they value
more, freedom or safety. It’s up to the people to demand both.
This special volume of Contemporary Aesthetics presents a
fascinating diversity of themes, demonstrating the various
rami cations of terrorism as an aesthetic and a ective
experience and navigating a wide spectrum of the aesthetics of
terror and terrorist, and also counterterrorist, activity from the
perspective of media, philosophy, literature, and art. Without a
doubt, to talk about aesthetics and terrorism in the same breath
may be a serious cause of misunderstanding. In his important
critical intervention in this volume, Berleant asks that we
remove Kantian disinterestedness from the act of aesthetically
appreciating terrorism because, as he insists, only an engaged,
rather than disinterested, kind of appreciation can do justice to
the horror of terrorist atrocity insofar as it testi es to the “moral
signi cance of aesthetic experience.”[53] All papers in this
volume attend to the need to respond to the question of terror
and terrorism through aesthetic approaches that do not
preclude but rather ensure the activation of the instinct for
ethics and individual and social responsibility. Opening
Pandora’s terror box by aesthetic means is a risk, yet one that is
worth taking. After all, according to the myth, hope, in the sense
of “expectation,” was the only element that remained inside the
box.[54]
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